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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Affirmative action, a notion characterized by both potential as well as 
predicament, is one of the most controversial concepts of equality law. This 
thesis examines the legal standpoint of affirmative action, its nature as well as 
its requirements and limitations within the international human rights sphere. 
The analysis reveals affirmative action as a variable obligation of States to 
combat discrimination and achieve substantive equality. The paper also 
presents different aspects of affirmative action in relation to the CEDAW, 
CRPD, CERD, ICCPR and ICESCR and shows that not all disadvantaged 
groups can benefit from the same prototype of special State measures.  
Finally, the thesis explores the relationship between various standards of 
equality and affirmative action. By using the views of Dworkin and Rawls on 
equality as input, the paper suggests that international human rights law has 
yet to contour the legal details that would make affirmative action a legitimate 
tool for achieving real and sustainable equality, as opposed to a formal 
equality that disregards the socio-structural and behavioral characteristics of 
each individual. 
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Questions, purpose and relevance 
	  
 
The main question of the thesis revolves around the relationship and the level 
of compatibility between affirmative action and equality within the 
international human rights system. In addition to that, the thesis also questions 
the terminology surrounding special measures, the normative character of 
affirmative action, attitudes towards these special State measures and the 
standpoint of equality in the international human rights system.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is to bridge different understandings of affirmative 
action and to build a delimitation of the notion in order to establish the level of 
compatibility between affirmative action and equality. Affirmative action 
policies are a modern technique used to combat discrimination and to that end, 
it is necessary to establish the legal foundation of affirmative action as well as 
the dynamic or possible hierarchy between these policies and equality. The 
thesis aims to determine the compatibility between these two notions, both at a 
transnational level as well as a national constitutional level, where they 
ultimately interact and determine each other’s legitimacy and functionality.  
 
Most studies on affirmative action have been limited to assessing whether a 
certain policy has had any effects on the levels of discrimination in a particular 
State and isolated one of the many discrimination grounds. For example, there 
are studies related to racial affirmative action or gender specific policies and 
their relation with the implementation of a specific human right. There have 
been studies that questioned public attitudes towards affirmative action and 
countless regional studies determining the scope and limitations of affirmative 
action within the European community framework.  
 
This study differentiates itself in the literature by not focusing on a specific 
area of affirmative action, but taking into account all discrimination fields. 
Instead of looking at the implementation of a singular affirmative action 
policy, this study evaluates its normative implications within the international 
human rights framework. The study questions the characteristics of affirmative 
action, its legal limitations and implications for a constitutional domestic 
system. Additionally, different typologies of equality are presented, such as 
formal, substantive and transformative equality. The relevance of the study 
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consists thus, in providing the literature with a comprehensive and holistic 
review of affirmative action. By disregarding specific types of discrimination 
and establishing a legal theoretical dynamic between special State measures 
and equality, this study reveals the advantages and disadvantages of 
affirmative action, its scope and meaning within international law, as well as 
the degree of enforceability of its elements that derive from different sources 
of international law. 
 
Methods and structure 
	  
 
 
The thesis employs a combination of methods in order to establish a holistic 
conceptualization of both affirmative action and equality.  
 
Chapter I consists of a literature review and a comparative examination of 
various notions describing special State measures. It is in that sense an 
empirical analysis of the historical and terminological implications of 
affirmative action and public attitudes towards it. In Chapter II, a legal 
dogmatic method has been employed for the analysis of Covenants, General 
Recommendations or Comments and State reports that deal with affirmative 
action. A partial doctrinal analysis of the relevant case law for some of the 
features of affirmative action can be identified in both Chapters I and II.  
 
Chapter III deals with the analysis of equality, presenting the realities of the 
international human rights system as lex lata and the opinions of Ronald 
Dworkin and John Rawls concerning equality, welfare and distributive justice 
as lex feranda. Chapter III empirically analyses substantive, formal and 
transformative equality as presented in international treaties and the works of 
human rights bodies and uses the theories of equality of Dworkin and Rawls to 
explain broader understandings of equality and how affirmative action could 
serve a much better purpose if the international human rights system would 
also employ the notion of equal concern for citizens. 
 
 Finally, in Chapter IV, I employed a deductive method to draw objective 
conclusions as to the level of compatibility between different equality 
typologies and affirmative action. 
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Chapter I. The history and conceptualization of Affirmative action 
1.1 Inception of the concept and historical evolution 
 
Affirmative action is a notion that refers to a wide number of policies or 
legislative measures that take into consideration factors such as gender, 
religion, race or color, with the purpose of correcting certain social imbalances 
and discriminative conditions by promoting an underrepresented group.1 As 
discussed below, affirmative action is one of the most contemporarily debated 
legal terms and thus, an evolving concept. 
Although the political preeminence of affirmative action begins in the United 
States circa 1960’, the term is modestly much younger. The first time 
affirmative action makes its legal appearance is in 1935, in the Wagner Act 
(US National Labor Relations Act) where it alludes to an employer’s 
obligations towards union workers and members.2 
In March 1961, President JFK issues Executive Order 10925 and unknowingly 
paves the way for what will become one of the most controversial concepts in 
the history of equality law.3 The order begins by proclaiming that 
“discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin is contrary to 
the Constitutional principles and policies of the United States” and although 
innovative, it did not, at that time, imply any quotas or measures to balance the 
under-representation of any minorities or disadvantaged groups.4 
With time, affirmative action became part of the larger civil rights movement 
and a more complex concept with various practical and theoretical 
assumptions. One of those and maybe the most important is that once these 
policies were put in motion, society recognized itself as discriminating and 
chose to perform a legal cleansing ritual that would wash away its past sins.5 
Affirmative action slowly becomes a compensatory action in the 70’s that 
maintains its legal status quo until 1978, when in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke the US Supreme Court rejects quotas as a legal principle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Leyla-Denisa Obreja, Affirmative action: friend or foe?, April 16th 2014 available at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/leyladenisa-obreja/affirmative-action-friend-or-foe as 
consulted on March 2nd 2015 at 12:32 pm.	  
2 W. E. Block and M. A. Walker, Discrimination, affirmative action, and equal opportunity: 
an economic and social perspective, Fraser Institute, cop. (1981) : Thomas Sowell, pg. 38.	  
3 Ibid, 39-40	  
4 Ibid, pg. 39-40	  
5 Ibid. pg. 149	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and deems it unconstitutional, but permits race to be a selection criterion and 
therefore upholds racial affirmative action.6 
In the United States, affirmative action begins declining in the early 90’s in 
terms of federal court’s approval of racial quotas.7 At the same time, it moves 
towards the international sphere, when human rights covenants are entering 
into force. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) comes into force in 1969, including in its 
articles 1(4) and  2(2) an obligation to adopt “special and concrete measures” 
that will ensure the adequate enjoyment and development of all racial groups 
of their human rights. It is not until 2009 that the Committee on the 
Elimination on Racial Discrimination decided to clarify the meaning of such 
special measures, finally concluding that they are the equivalent of affirmative 
action.8 
In 1981, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) comes into force. This instrument too contains a 
clause that refers to affirmative action in the form of “temporary special 
measures”. Unlike other instruments or General Comments, CEDAW alludes 
to the temporality of the measures within the text of the Convention in its 
article 4, making the limited duration of such measures thus binding. In its 
General Recommendation 25, the CEDAW Committee rejects the terminology 
of “affirmative action” due to its link with historical compensatory and 
promotional senses and urges States to use the modern term “temporary 
special measures”.  In 1989, the Human Rights Committee adopts its General 
Comment 18 on matters of discrimination in relation to the ICCPR provision, 
mentioning affirmative action in its paragraph 10 as a mean to “eliminate or 
diminish discrimination”. Finally, the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD), a contemporary human rights instrument also 
contains an affirmative action clause, specifically article 5(4) that suggests that 
“specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto 
equality” should not be deemed as discrimination.  
It is thus important to signal at this point that the United Nations has not been 
consistent throughout history in maintaining a firm position regarding its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Decided June 28, 1978, 
Davis [438 U.S. 265, 326].  	  
7 Lipson, D. N., The Resilience of Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Innovation, Isomorphism, 
and Institutionalization in University Admissions, (2011), Political Research Quarterly, 64(1), 
132-144, p.132-133.	  
8 CERD, General Recommendation 32, CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009.	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terminology. The term “affirmative action” has been highly debated, confused 
with similar terms, interpreted and speculated within the modern scholarship.  
The fight against discrimination has been tackled by the UN with disparate 
semantics, ranging from “positive action” in General Comment 5 of the 
CESCR Committee to “special measures”, “temporary special measures” or 
“special and concrete measures” as mentioned above. Although rarely 
constructed as such in the UN language, affirmative action has also been used 
as an equivalent of “positive discrimination”, “reverse discrimination” or 
“positive action”. At a time where international law is significantly expanding 
and fragmenting, a terminological confusion that falls upon terms with such 
high value and importance for social change such as “affirmative action” is 
eminently unfortunate. For that reason, a following and brief part of this paper 
will be dedicated to a potential clarification of both affirmative action and 
positive action, as the main concepts and representatives of State measures 
that attempt to combat under representation and past and current 
discriminations. 
 
1.2 Delimitation problems within the modern legal definition 
 
In its General Recommendation 32, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination allows for the term “affirmative action” to be used as an 
equivalent of “special measures” but discourages such usage in the reporting 
activity. Moreover, it deems “positive discrimination” as an unsuitable term 
and a contradictio in terminis. In fact, in the UN system and documents, 
affirmative action has never been used under different umbrella terms such as 
‘’reversed’’ or ‘’positive discrimination’’. Proponents of these terms are 
mostly found among the civil society, which use it rather to explain and point 
out a perceived alarming effect of these measures.9 
As explained rather vaguely in an easily overlooked note of the General 
Recommendation 25 of the CEDAW Committee, affirmative action is a term 
predominantly employed in the United States, whereas other States, mostly 
European, prefer to define these measures as “positive action”. The UN seems 
to reject the term “positive action”, because I imagine it could potentially be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9See https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/colin-joseph/positive-discrimination-may-have-
to-be-introduced-at-bbc as consulted on May 13th 2015 at 10:08am. 
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confused with another concept of international law, that is, the positive 
obligations of States, as part of the positive-negative binary referring to State 
responsibilities. The UN appears to fail to provide a convincing explanation 
regarding the difference between the terms but luckily a European 
Commission study points out important aspects for the differentiation.   
The 2009 European Commission consortium mandated with the study and 
elucidation of the legal definition of “positive measures” dedicated a broad 
part to the clarification of the concept.10 The research explains that affirmative 
action has been terminologically predominant in non-European countries, 
especially in the United States and it is linked with quotas, a practice rather 
rare and inconsistent within Europe, due to the views of the European Court of 
Justice in the Briheche case.11 The same study found that quotas as part of 
positive action are not illegal in Europe but more likely permitted for disability 
rather than gender due to the broader meaning of positive measures in the 
context of preferential treatment and integration of people with disabilities.  
Amongst other findings in the Briheche case, the Court (ECJ) notes that 
equality measures “although discriminatory in appearance’’ can be allowed 
under European law if the aim of such measures is to achieve substantive 
rather than formal equality but rejects the use of quotas disregarding merits 
within the labor market. The same European consortium also points out that 
positive measures, a term embraced within its Member States, do not imply an 
“unconditional preferential treatment” as opposed to affirmative action that 
appears to be characterized by “strong forms of preferential treatment”.  
The judicial practice regarding the implementation of such measures within 
Europe shows that positive action that “automatically and unconditionally” 
advantages the under-represented group is unlawful and should be rather 
deemed as positive discrimination.12 A trans-national study aimed at verifying 
the understanding of positive action and positive discrimination within 
organisations concluded that 19% of the participants confuse the terms and 
that the most agreed statement equivalent to positive action is ‘’commitment to 
diversity and equality’’.13 The confusion appeared much higher within 
European countries as opposed to the US, where organisations did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 International perspectives on positive action measures : A comparative analysis in the 
European Union, Canada, the United States and South Africa, European Commission 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, (2009). 
11 Case C-319/03 Briheche [2004], para. 23 and 31. 
12 Ibid	  
13 Archibong, U; et al., Positive Action Measures across Different Equality Grounds, 
Organisations and Sectors in European and Non-European Countries, International Journal of 
Diversity in Organisations, Communities & Nations. 10, ( 2010), pg. 178-180. 
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associate affirmative action with discrimination.14  One of the most important 
UN documents correlated with affirmative action is the Special Rapporteur’s 
Bossuyt report to the Commission on Human Rights.15 Although the report 
explains the necessity of such measures, their relationship with the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination and provides several cases where the merits 
were affirmative action related, it fails to provide a definition of the concept. 
Moreover, the report uses all terms such as ‘’positive State action”, “special 
measures” and “temporary special measures” while failing to distinguish 
between them.  
Severe gaps in the literature and in the working documents of international and 
regional human rights bodies can be easily identified. The fact that European 
countries seem to prefer the term positive action while affirmative action 
seems to be an American conception and preference is also not entirely 
accurate. For example, I have examined the country reports to the CEDAW 
Committee and they signal that European States such as Belgium or France 
use the same terminology (affirmative action) as non-Europeans such as 
Australia or Kenya when referring to article 4 of the Convention that regulates 
temporary special measures. 16  
Regardless of the terminology and geographical disparities, it is important to 
assert if these terms refer to the same State practices. If not, what does 
affirmative action specifically entail that differs from positive action? Are 
these two concepts, different sides of the same coin?  
The European Commission study that was earlier mentioned noted the absence 
of a legal working definition of positive action and moved to define it as 
“proportionate measures undertaken with the purpose of achieving full and 
effective equality in practice for members of groups that are socially or 
economically disadvantaged, or otherwise face the consequences of past or 
present discrimination or disadvantage”.17 At the same time, I have selected 
for comparison, one of the most comprehensive and consistent definitions of 
affirmative action present in the literature. In an occasional paper for the 
UNDP, Daniel Sabbagh defines affirmative action as “any measure that 
allocates goods – such as admission into universities, jobs, promotions, public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid 
15 Comprehensive examination of thematic issues relating to racial discrimination, The 
concept and practice of affirmative action, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/11, (2000), Commission on 
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
16 See Australia CEDAW/C/AUL/3, Belgium CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, Kenya 
CEDAW/C/KEN/6, France CEDAW/C/FRA/3. 
17	  Supra, note 10, pg 6	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contracts, business loans, and rights to buy and sell land – on the basis of 
membership in a designated group, for the purpose of increasing the 
proportion of members of that group in the relevant labor force, 
entrepreneurial class, or university student population, where they are 
currently underrepresented as a result of past or present discrimination”. 18 
Although the definition is contoured by referencing Myron Weiner’s views on 
preferential policies in 1983, it still manages to clearly and realistically portray 
the elements of affirmative action. 19  
After a careful analysis of both definitions, the following conclusions can be 
formulated. First of all, affirmative action as an international concept has the 
tendency to be linked with a proportionality requirement. For that reason, at 
the time of its implementation within national laws, affirmative action has 
been at times rejected for being disproportionate. In Ballantyne, Davidson, 
McIntyre v. Canada, a case that discussed the proportionality of advertising 
measures employed to protect the francophone group of Canada, the Human 
Rights Committee found that placing a limitation on the English speaking 
community’s right to freedom of expression by only allowing advertising in 
French would be disproportionate. 20 Moreover, the question of proportionality 
has been raised by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights during 
an analysis of affirmative action and its compatibility with the principle of 
equality.21 The Inter-American Commission stated in that occasion that one of 
the most important questions when assessing such compatibility is whether 
these measures are “proportional to the end sought”.  
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights notes in D.H. and others v. 
The Czech Republic, the importance of special measures for combating racial 
segregation and when referring to matters of discrimination states that 
differential treatment is discriminatory if it fails to prove a “reasonable 
relationship of proportionality”.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report Office, Occasional 
Paper, Background paper for HDR (2004), Affirmative Action Policies: An International 
Perspective, Daniel Sabbagh, pg. 1.	  
19 See Weiner Myron, The Political Consequences of Preferential Policies: A Comparative 
Perspective, (1983), Comparative Politics 16 (1): 35-52. 	  
20	   Communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 
385/1989/Rev.1 (1993).	  
21 Considerations regarding the compatibility of affirmative action measures designed to 
promote the political participation of women with the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/women/Chapter6.htm, as consulted on 
April 2nd  2015 at 10:33 am.  
22 Case of D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, para. 196. 
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Secondly, affirmative action measures as well as positive action, as by the 
above definitions are likely to be linked to issues of under-representation. That 
usually implies that States use these measures to correct certain representation 
imbalances in industries such as employment or education where people 
belonging to a vulnerable group have either less to access or are simply less 
inclined to partake in. The problem of under-representation is usually solved 
by using affirmative action, specifically quotas, to obtain a fair and 
proportional participation of all groups within certain social areas and 
industries.  
In General Recommendation 5, the CEDAW Committee expressively 
mentions quota systems as a tool for the advancement of women into “into 
education, the economy, politics and employment”. One example of successful 
quota systems is reflected by the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Iceland 
and Norway) whose political parties promote proportionate voluntarily quotas 
in their regulations to increase the participation of women in the political 
sphere.23 In Sweden, voluntarily neutral quotas have managed to increase the 
participation of women from 14% in 1971 to an average of 45% in 2002.24 
A common trait of both affirmative and positive action in the definitions of the 
scholarship is that these measures target individuals belonging to a vulnerable 
or discriminated group. The positive action definition used earlier states that 
these groups are to be “socially or economically disadvantaged” whereas the 
affirmative action definition notes that an inclusion in these groups bares an 
unfair allocation of goods. At this point it is important to remember that both 
positive and affirmative action target individuals belonging to predetermined 
discriminated groups. That implies that an individual does not need to prove a 
direct and explicit consequence of discrimination on his life and his socio-
economical status in order to become a beneficiary of affirmative action. The 
laws or policies consistent with affirmative action contain therefore a 
presumption of prejudice, both collective and individual. Having discussed 
various aspects of affirmative and positive action, it is possible to conclude 
that although these terms have been claimed to be associated with different 
measures, consequences or geographical interpretations they can be used 
interchangeably, as they are linked by the same core objectives and 
prerequisites. In my opinion the association of positive and affirmative action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 IDEA, Sweden: women’s representation in Parliament available at 
http://www.idea.int/news/upload/sweden_women.pdf as consulted on April 6th  2015 at 11:44 
am. 
24 Ibid	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with terms such as reversed or positive discrimination should be avoided and 
deemed as incorrect, since the latter concepts only make reference to potential 
negative consequences of special measures that generally do not define them. 
It would be thus correct to say that when affirmative action purports negative 
consequences on individuals who do not belong to the targeted group, it is 
disproportional and thus creates a reversed discrimination effect, otherwise 
allowed as exceptional by the international human rights system.25 
Affirmative and positive action imply State and non-State actors measures put 
in motion with the objective of correcting past or present discriminations, 
social imbalances or industry under-representation for individuals and 
collectives affected by an unfair distribution of goods or an unfair result of a 
fair distribution. At the same time, both concepts may or may not imply quota 
systems and depending on the degree of vulnerability the group faces, may or 
may not be proportional. Until the use of adjacent concepts of special 
measures will be unified and coordinated within the scholarship and the 
States’ reporting system, the delimitation of affirmative action will remain 
difficult and perhaps irrelevant. In reality, what is fundamental when 
discussing affirmative action is to symbolically reduce the complexity of the 
term to the idea of special measures and later on identify its characteristics and 
its compatibility with other legal principles, both of which will be discussed 
along the lines of this paper.  
 
1.3 Characteristics of affirmative action and positive measures 
 
The most important characteristics of special measures that I have chosen to 
discuss are temporality, compensation, and the existence of a targeted group. 
The interaction between these characteristics and the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination will be discussed at a later point, after clarifying the 
meaning of the principle of equality and the standpoint of special measures 
within the international human rights system. 
One paramount characteristic of affirmative action is that, generally, it appears 
to be formulated as temporary and compensatory.26 Given that a prerequisite 
of affirmative action is an under-representation or social struggle of a group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Supra, note 10, pg. 26	  
26 Supra, note 15, para. 83 
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within a community, it is reasonable that the life span of these measures will 
depend on the subsistence and persistence of discriminatory or unfair 
treatments of such groups within societies. The limited duration of affirmative 
action comes established, inter alia, in article 4 of the CEDAW and article 2.2 
of the CERD (as well as General Recommendation 32 of the Committee) or 
General Recommendation 20 of the CESCR Committee. The latter 
Recommendation reveals that special measures “should be discontinued when 
substantive equality has been sustainably achieved”. However, the same 
Recommendation states that some measures might need to be of “permanent 
nature”.27 Thus, in relation to social, cultural and economical rights and with 
the goal of achieving substantive and formal equality, special measures can at 
least in theory be legitimately permanent. In relation to cultural and political 
rights, the Human Rights Committee establishes in General Recommendation 
18 that “such action may involve granting for a time to the part of the 
population concerned certain preferential treatment”. The temporality of 
affirmative action is thus broader for economical, cultural and social rights and 
States enjoy in this sense a larger margin of appreciation as for the duration of 
the measures. 
Measures of permanent nature can also be found in General Recommendation 
25 of the CEDAW Committee that explains that all measures that have the 
goal of achieving de facto equality between men and women are temporary 
but those measures related to the non-identical treatment of the sexes due to 
biological differences, and as mentioned in article 4.2 of the Convention, 
aimed at protecting maternity, can be of permanent nature.  
The European Commission study mentioned at earlier stages of this paper also 
discusses the ambivalent temporality of positive and affirmative action, 
explaining that these measures are not provisional by default and may need to 
be extended for long periods of times, especially when the consequences of 
discrimination are deeply embedded into society. Such indefinite measures are 
defined as permanent positive action schemes.28  It is imperative to understand 
that even when affirmative action is temporary it is constructed with the goal 
of achieving long-term or permanent equality. 29 Such aims could nevertheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment No. 
20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 July 
(2009) E/C.12/GC/20, para. 9.	  
28 Supra, note 10, pg.26 
29 Miller, Conrad. The Persistent Effect of Temporary Affirmative Action, Working paper, 
Department of Economics, MIT (2014).	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burden its potential and backfire into policy failures. As explained by Miller in 
a recent article, the long-term effects of temporary affirmative action on 
inequalities will depend on the contextual economical ensemble of a certain 
State and in some cases it may need to be permanent for “group gains to 
persist”.30 International human rights law provides in relation to some rights 
the possibility of indefinite affirmative action and States enjoy a large margin 
of appreciation for the determination of the duration of corrective policies. 
International human rights law temporally delimitates affirmative action in 
some cases, but fails to identify an ideal period of time for each type of 
positive measure to be adopted by States. It is thus the responsibility of the 
State in question to balance the principle of equality with the needs of 
disadvantaged groups when determining the implementation and duration of 
special measures.  
The second trait of affirmative action is its compensatory nature, expressively 
mentioned in General Comment 25 of the CEDAW Committee that defines 
special measures as “corrective, compensatory and promotional”. The working 
definition proposed by the European Commission study also references 
compensation as a main constituent of positive action and establishes that it 
should target those social imbalances that “arose in the past or are still 
ongoing”.31 
As explained by Corlett, compensation in this case should not be understood 
as reparation or as a legal remedy but rather as a method of supporting 
disadvantaged groups access those goods or industries within which their 
prevalence has been historically low due to a long-term demonstrated or 
repetitive discrimination.32 Thus, compensation is not an unconditional 
privilege but more of a corrective mechanism employed to combat “conditions 
that impair the enjoyment of equal rights”.33  
The philosophical perspective of making amends for discrimination has been 
recently discussed by Hull that differentiates between compensation and 
rectification and explains that the former does not provide a sufficient and 
proportional redress for those harmed by discrimination and that other State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, pg. 2-3 
31 Supra, note 10, pg. 24 
32 J. Angelo Corlett, The whitewashing of Affirmative Action, Race and Human Rights, Edited 
by Curtis Stokes, Michigan State University Press, Eurospan  East Lansing, Mich., London 
 (2009), First Ed., pg. 257-259. 
33 Supra, note 15, pg.19 
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measures should complement it.34 Hull believes that not every individual 
belonging to a disadvantaged group is likely to be compensated proportionally 
to the harm done by affirmative action programs.  
Attitudes towards the compensatory nature of racial affirmative action in the 
USA were observed by Lynch and Beer35 in 1990 when public opinion polls 
showed that white Americans encouraged preferential and additional training 
of African Americans in compensation of their historical disadvantage but 
consistently rejected quotas. Although modern studies have not examined 
current attitudes towards the compensatory nature of affirmative action, it is 
still problematic due to Hull’s explanation which I also described earlier as a 
presumption of prejudice.  
Affirmative action builds itself over a foundation of historical discrimination 
and disadvantage of particular groups, be that women, people with disabilities, 
racial and ethnical minorities or religious groups. Such groups either directly 
discriminated by the normative construct of a State or de facto disadvantaged 
by a lack of equal opportunity to access goods or industries are compensated 
individually and collectively by policies that seek to reconstruct the social 
order. It is hard to determine whether affirmative action can systemically 
redress the social-economical status of all individuals affected by 
discrimination and if so to what degree. Although compensation is a form of 
social equity, in the sense that it seeks a redistribution of goods in society, it 
does not guarantee by itself a long-term and sustainable equal access to 
industries for disadvantaged groups. I believe that the degree to which 
individuals will be materially compensated will depend on the combination of 
how affirmative action is implemented, the degree of proportionality it entails 
and its duration. 
The third characteristic of affirmative action is represented by the existence of 
a disadvantaged group. This trait might be the most important one, since in my 
own view delineates ordinary governmental policies from special measures. 
As mentioned earlier, affirmative action was born and developed within the 
US civil rights movement and originated as a measure to achieve racial 
equality. Once the principle of non-discrimination was crystallized and 
embedded in the international human rights system, other vulnerable groups 
who were disadvantaged by portraying a common trait (discrimination ground) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Hull, George, Affirmative Action and the Choice of Amends, Philosophia 43, no. 1: 113-
134. Humanities International Complete (2015), pg. 124-126. 
35 See Lynch, F. R., & Beer, W. R, You ain't the right color, pal, Policy Review, (51), 64. 
(1990).	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were targeted by affirmative measures. In Europe, most affirmative action 
employment policies today target women, people with disabilities and 
individuals belonging to an ethnic group.36 In regards to access to goods and 
services such as housing and education, advantaged groups are retired people, 
people with disabilities, ethnic groups (such as Roma people who enjoy 
special education measures in Romania, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, etc.) or 
women who enjoy political quotas in most European countries.37  
The grounds for affirmative action are theoretically possible for any of the 
grounds for non-discrimination provided by international human rights law. 
As mentioned in article 2 of the UDHR, such grounds are “ race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”. One individual can belong to more than one 
vulnerable group and affirmative action policies can target broader or inter-
sectional discrimination. Such is the Multiculturalism Act (1988) of Canada, a 
law that sets out the possibility for intersectional affirmative action, offering 
linguistic promotion for the francophone minority and commits the 
government to “promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the 
understanding of and respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian 
society”. 38 
Affirmative action thus, seeks to improve the social condition of “minorities 
and those who are made minorities by virtue of discrimination”.39 
Nevertheless, without an element of demonstrated societal difficulty, 
inequality and substantive disadvantage States cannot put in motion positive 
measures for a particular community or vulnerable group. That is because 
affirmative action needs to have a legitimate aim but also because not all 
discrimination grounds imply the same level of international obligations to be 
combated. As it will be demonstrated below, affirmative action is a variable 
obligation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36Report Equinet, The European Network of Equality Bodies available at: 
http://www.equineteurope.org/Positive-Action-Measures, (2014), pg. 29, as consulted on April 
15th 2015 at 10:33 am. 
37 Ibid, pg. 38-41	  
38 The Act is available at : http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html as 
consulted on April 18th 2015 at 14:45 pm. 
39 Romany, C., & Chu, J, Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law: A Critical 
Perspective of Its Normative Assumptions (2003), Connecticut Law Review, pg.831.	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1.4 Affirmative Action Attitudes 
 
Affirmative action, although an 80 year old concept, is still growing and 
evolving, both in its legal form and practicalities. I have demonstrated so far 
that within the international human rights system, both States and international 
organisations have not agreed on a singular definition of affirmative action and 
that adjacent terms may appear in both soft and hard law. As mentioned above, 
analogous terms of affirmative action can be used until the terminological 
unification has been accomplished internationally as long as the characteristics 
of affirmative action are identified and their compatibility with other legal 
principles has been taken into consideration when implemented into domestic 
systems. 
Nevertheless, the current uncertainty that surrounds special measures affects 
its legality and additionally can influence public attitudes towards affirmative 
action policies. Affirmative action directly affects discrimination by seeking to 
build up equal opportunities using preferential treatment as a tool. Indirectly, 
affirmative action policies influence equality by affecting social stereotypes, 
creating a beneficial effect or backfiring and consolidating harmful 
stereotypes.  
For example and in relation to gender based affirmative action, a 2013 
experimental study upholds the theory that affirmative action produces 
stereotypes threats.40 A stereotype threat is, to my understanding, a 
psychological construct that explains how reminding beneficiaries of special 
measures of their belonging in a disadvantage category makes them sub-
perform and underachieve or simply to conform to a negative stereotype.41 
The same study found that this form of self-stereotyping, did not affect men 
(in this case the advantaged group), in relation to their task performance as 
opposed to women. The study is contemporary and one of the first of its kind 
and it concludes by mentioning that macro-denouements should be formulated 
with caution.  
Aside from self-stereotyping, affirmative action has been portrayed as 
negatively sedimenting existing stereotypes for disadvantaged groups in 
certain communities or situations. For example, at the work place, sex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Bracha, A., Cohen, A., & Conell-Price, L, Affirmative Action and Stereotype Threat 
(2013), Working Paper Series (Federal Reserve Bank Of Boston), 13(14), pg. 1-27. 
41 Ibid, pg.2 
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discrimination can be affected by affirmative action programs that “can 
reaffirm and reinforce sex stereotypes and therefore, paradoxically, sometimes 
create additional basis for biased judgments and discriminatory actions”.42 A 
1993 study also suggests that at the work place, minorities that enjoy 
affirmative action and preferential treatment sometimes do not enjoy the 
hypothesis of these policies aimed at creating “permanent gains”.43  In fact, the 
study found that in certain cases affirmative action can worsen negative 
minorities’ stereotypes. This happens mainly when the employer “patronizes 
favored workers”, a situation that pushes beneficiaries into not acquiring much 
needed skills and ultimately towards underperformance. 44 
It is unclear whether the negative effects of affirmative action on stereotypes 
are caused by a misunderstanding of the causes that led to the adoption of 
these policies by the general population and how this perception interacts with 
self-stereotyping individual attitudes. It is also unclear what predicts support 
for affirmative action policies within the general population, as studies are 
limited and non-differentiating between the grounds for discrimination 
targeted.  
A 2009 study related to gender-based affirmative action in the US implies that 
racial based policies receive less support than gender affirmative action and 
that “interests, gender attitudes, and beliefs about the role of government in 
limiting economic stratification predict both men’s and women’s support for 
gender-related affirmative action”.45 Similarly, Baunach explains that gender 
is not a predictor for gender related affirmative action and that there is a great 
amount of difference between gender and racial affirmative action.46 
Baunach’s paper also finds race to indeed act as a predictor for preferential 
treatment support and explains that “the threat posed by gender-based 
affirmative action is perceived as less serious than the threat posed by race-
based affirmative action”. Although the relationship between affirmative 
action and discriminating stereotypes falls outside the scope of this paper, it is 
important to note that these policies can, in some instances, not only fail to 
combat discrimination but sustain it within some facets of society. As I will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Heilman, M. E, Sex Discrimination and the Affirmative Action Remedy: The Role of Sex 
Stereotypes, (1997). Journal Of Business Ethics, 16(9), 877-889, pg. 883. 
43 Coate, S., & Loury, G. C., Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes? 
(1993), The American Economic Review, (5), pg. 1220 and 1239. 	  
44 Ibid 
45 Kane, E. W., & Whipkey, K J., Predictors of public support for gender-related affirmative 
action, (2009), Public Opinion Quarterly, 73(2), pg. 233-254. 
46 Baunach, D. M., Progress, opportunity, and backlash: explaining attitudes toward gender-
based affirmative action, (2002), Sociological Focus, (4). 345, pg. 359-360.	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prove below, it is exactly the principle of equality and non-discrimination that 
originated affirmative action practice and these limited failures prove to be 
important aspects when considering the compatibility between special 
measures and equality. The impact of stereotypes on discrimination should not 
be overlooked and it is thus important to identify what role certain outcomes 
of affirmative action play in the compatibility assessment.  
 
Chapter II. The normative character of affirmative action inside the 
international human rights law system 
2.1 Introduction 
	  
Due to the fact that affirmative action appears both in international Covenants 
and General Recommendations, as well as other documents of international 
human rights bodies, it is important to try to establish the value and strength of 
these special measures. This determination will eventually allow us to 
objectively verify the weight of affirmative action in relation to other rights 
and principles, such as the right to equality and non-discrimination that 
represents the central analysis of this thesis. 
First I will examine those special measures expressively mentioned by 
international treaties. Secondly, I will analyze special measures as they appear 
in General Comments and Recommendations and finally determine the extent 
to which these are binding on States and the margin of appreciation for States 
to interpret and implement affirmative action policies. Below I have assembled 
a table that makes it easier to observe the allocation of special measures for 
each ground of discrimination, within the specific human rights instrument. 
 
 Treaty and Article General Recommendation/Comment 
CEDAW (article 4) GR. 25 
CERD (articles 1.4 and 2.2) GR. 32 
ICCPR        - GC. 18 
CRPD (article 5.4)      - 
ICESCR     - GC 5,  GC 20 and GC 16 
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Note that the only human rights instruments to not mention special measures 
in their texts are the ICCPR and ICESCR. These Covenants do contain clauses 
that refer to the right to equality and non-discrimination and both specialized 
human rights bodies have dictated Comments that discuss special measures. 
The implications of the treaty void related to affirmative action in the context 
of civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights will 
be discussed below. Another important reminder is that for some 
disadvantaged groups, more than one Covenant regulates special measures as a 
potential equality building strategy. For example, for women, we might find 
applicable and relevant the CEDAW and GR 25 but at the same time the 
CESCR GC 16. Similarly, for people with disabilities, both the CRPD and the 
CESCR GC 5 are relevant. That is because “some individuals or groups of 
individuals face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited grounds” 
and such multi-discrimination “merits particular consideration and 
remedying”.47 
 
2.2 Affirmative action in human rights treaties and general comments or 
recommendations 
 
In relation to gender equality and affirmative action targeting sex 
discrimination, the CEDAW article 4 and GR 25 establish that special 
measures should be temporary “until equality of opportunity and treatment 
have been achieved”. The CEDAW Committee makes it clear that “the 
provision of general conditions in order to guarantee the civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of women and the girl child, designed to 
ensure for them a life of dignity and non-discrimination, cannot be called 
temporary special measures”.48 This does not come as a surprise, due to the 
fact that both sets of rights are protected by the ICCPR and ICESCR and both 
Covenants contain non-discrimination clauses, obligating States to guarantee 
women with such rights. So what do these special measures imply for States 
and what is the extent of the obligation to put in motion affirmative action 
policies when inequality demands them? This will depend on the 
discrimination ground in question. 
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All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures, (2004).	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The CEDAW Committee offered an answer to both questions in GR 25, 
urging States to regard affirmative action policies as an obligation and 
explained that the interpretation of the term “measures” should be broad. The 
Convention establishes direct obligations for States, and it is a legally binding 
document.49 These measures can range from “outreach or support 
programmes; allocation and/or reallocation of resources; preferential 
treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and promotion; numerical goals 
connected with time frames; and quota systems” to “areas of credit and loans, 
sports, culture and recreation, and legal awareness”.50 For the purpose of 
observing State practices in relation to article 4 of the CEDAW, I have chosen 
to briefly analyze 5 random country reports and determine what the most used 
set of affirmative action is.  
Romania’s Sixth periodic Report mentions affirmative action in the form of 
“special programs for employment and vocational training” and explains that 
the legislation is designed to protect maternity and pregnant women at the 
workplace by providing them with the adequate safety and health conditions.51 
Belgium’s combined Third and Fourth periodic Reports define affirmative 
action “as a coherent set of measures intended to bring about de facto equality 
between men and women in all areas of labor organization and human 
resource management” and mention the efforts made in both the public and 
private sector de advance gender equality in the field of work. Moreover, the 
measures adopted to protect maternity are also predominantly work related. 52 
Japan’s Fifth periodic Report explains that the special measures adopted are 
related to the inclusion of women in decision-making processes, both at a 
national and local level and their participation in policy planning. Measures 
also include the allocation of gender rations for the recruitment in National 
Advisory Council and Committees, affirmative action in the workplace, 
support for entrepreneur women and measures to sustain a wider participation 
of women in education, by promoting them as faculty members. 53 
Mexico’s Sixth periodic Report talks about positive compensatory measures, 
ranging from strengthening the permanency in education of women to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Women’s rights to equality: The promise of CEDAW 
(2014), pg.7. 
50 Supra note 48, para. 37-38 
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supporting domestic violence victims by creating a shelter network.54 Mexican 
measures also target the media and women’s portrayal within it, health 
insurance with a pecuniary advantage for women with low income, a credit 
line with a 10% participation of single mothers, education and a program for 
indigenous women.55  
Nepal’s combined Second and Third periodic Reports mention that Nepalese 
measures include quotas for local bodies participation, civil service and 
workplace incentives and advantages, like the creation of child daily care 
centers in establishments with over 50 female workers and inter-sectional 
affirmative action commitments for disabled and multi-disadvantaged 
women.56   
It can be observed that affirmative action in the area of gender discrimination 
is predominantly related to labor rights, as a method to ensure that women are 
given the appropriate opportunities and a working context that responds to 
their biological differences, such as special treatment for pregnant women. In 
my view, within the CEDAW affirmative action is not contemplated as a right. 
In fact, as I will try to prove during this paper, special measures are all 
designed differently than traditional human rights. Although affirmative action 
implies a direct obligation for States, it is rather an obligation to fulfill other 
rights. Firstly, affirmative action is a mean to achieve gender equality, 
fulfilling thus the right to equality and non-discrimination. Secondly, it is a 
way to achieve such equality in the exercise of other rights, such as the rights 
contemplated by the CEDAW (the right to political and public life, specific 
employment right, the right to education, health care…etc). Affirmative action 
in the sphere of gender discrimination should thus target to fulfill all the rights 
provided by the CEDAW and be directed for the “allocation and relocation” of 
services beyond employment. The nature of affirmative action as a catalyst for 
the fulfillment of other rights will be later discussed in depth, once other types 
have been examined within other international treaties. Finally, it is important 
to reiterate that affirmative action in the field of gender discrimination is 
legally binding as temporary, although the Committee has expressed that in 
the fields related to maternity, it can be of permanent nature.57 Given that the 
permanent nature has been established in a GR and not in the text of the treaty, 
it will be later assessed if the potential permanent nature has a binding force.  
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In relation to disabilities, the CRPD contains a brief reference to “specific 
measures” in article 5.4 and states that “specific measures which are necessary 
to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of persons with disabilities shall not 
be considered discrimination under the terms of the present Convention”. The 
specialized Committee that deals with disabilities has not yet adopted a 
General Comment related to article 5. In a co-authored handbook by the UN 
and the Inter-Parliamentary Union that aims at realizing and explaining the 
content of the rights provided by the Convention and addresses 
parliamentarians, it is interpreted that article 5.4 contains the legal basis for 
both temporary special measures and permanent measures.58 The same 
handbook notes that “a State party will be obliged to adopt a range of special 
measures across different areas of social life”.59 It is unclear and highly 
unfortunate that the CRPD, a Convention of novelty, effective since only a 
few years ago (2008) chooses to operate under different terminologies by 
referring to “specific measures”. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the text of the 
treaty allows for affirmative action in the area of disabilities but creates a legal 
void as to what such measures imply, their duration and their scope and 
purpose.  As it will be discussed below, the absence of a General Comment by 
the CRPD and of a more extensive obligation within this treaty will determine 
an unclear and low-enforceable obligation for States to take affirmative action 
in the sphere of disabilities.  
In the field of racial discrimination, the CERD contains affirmative action 
clauses in both the text of the treaty and the GR 32. Article 1.4 establishes that 
special measures should be taken with the sole purpose of “securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such 
protection”. The same article also contains the limits to affirmative action in 
the racial sphere, which are temporality and the prohibition of “maintenance of 
separate rights for different racial groups”. As explained by GR 32, “the 
reference to ‘sole purpose’ limits the scope of acceptable motivations for 
special measures within the terms of the Convention”.Furthermore, article 2.2 
establishes that “states Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, 
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete 
measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial 
groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them 
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
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59 Ibid, pg. 67 
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GR 32 provides a great explanation regarding the nature of racial affirmative 
action by explaining that it should not be confused with permanent rights such 
as “the rights of indigenous peoples or the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities”. It also mentions that an individual can at the same time enjoy both 
special measures and his permanent rights recognized within the international 
human rights system. The temporary nature of racial affirmative action is 
established and reiterated in the text of the Convention, making it legally 
binding, both the implementation of such measures and their limited duration. 
The same interpretation is made by the CERD Committee when explaining 
that “the verb shall in relation to taking special measures clearly indicates the 
mandatory nature of the obligation to take such measures [and] the mandatory 
nature of the obligation is not weakened by the addition of the phrase when the 
circumstances so warrant”.60 In order to practically comprehend the meaning 
of “measures” within the racial context I have chosen to examine the Report of 
the CERD of the Sixtieth and Sixty-first Sessions, where the Committee 
makes contextual and evidence-based recommendations, depending on the 
situation of every State. 61 
For Costa Rica, the Committee recommends affirmative action related to the 
representation of national minorities at judicial and governmental levels.62 For 
the UK, the Committee acknowledges the special measures adopted for the 
Roma people but mentions that for other minorities, affirmative action should 
be adopted in the field of “employment, education, housing and health”.63 An 
extremely important observation is made by the Committee in relation to 
Madagascar, by stating that “the principle of non-discrimination is not subject 
to the availability of resources”.64  
The observation is important because of two problems that arise in regards 
with racial affirmative action and other types of special measures derived from 
other discrimination grounds. The first problem relates to the wording of the 
CERD in this case, which mentions that affirmative action has to be employed 
in the area of economical, social and cultural rights. Although other areas are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Seventy-fifth session, August 
(2009), General Comment 32, para. 30. 
61 General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-seventh Session Supplement (2002).No. 18 
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62 Ibid ,para 81 
63 CERD Report of the Sixty-second session and Sixty-third Session, A/58/18 (2003) pg. 88, 
para. 543. 
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allowed, all types of affirmative action are strongly connected to economical, 
social and cultural rights due to the connection between economical rights and 
equality itself. This connection will be discussed later, when a detailed 
examination of the principle of equality will be performed. For now, it is 
important to acknowledge that affirmative action is generally connected to 
such rights. Some of these rights are understood to be of delayed or 
progressive realization by States and are to be fulfilled to the maximum of 
States’ available resources.65 The right to equality and non-discrimination is 
nevertheless, in the view of the UN of immediate realization.66 If affirmative 
action is not a right, but a temporary or even permanent catalyst for the 
realization in this case of economical, social and cultural rights, can we 
conclude that all these rights with no exception are of immediate realization? 
Formulated more clearly, does affirmative action as an expression of the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination determines the immediate 
realization of the right that it tries to guarantee? For the formulation of a 
competent answer to this question it is necessary to turn to three relevant GC 
of the CESCR Committee. 
GC 5 refers to State obligations regarding economic, social and cultural rights 
for disabled persons. The Committee discussed the progressive realization of 
rights for this particular disadvantaged group and concluded that the insurance 
of economic, cultural and social equality ”almost invariably means that 
additional resources will need to be made available for this purpose and that a 
wide ran specially tailored measures will be required”.67 Although GC 20 does 
not discuss affirmative action, it refers to the right to equality and non-
discrimination for ECS rights and the Committee explains that “non-
discrimination is an immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the Covenant”. 
GC 16 refers to affirmative action by establishing that in the sphere of ESC 
rights it should be temporary and proportional and also mentions that the right 
of equality between men and women is of immediate realization. 
Special measures and the right to equality hold a central and vital place in the 
design of the ESC Covenant but, as I mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR contain special measures 
provisions within their texts. Affirmative action in the field of ESC rights, as 
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66 Ibid, pg.15 
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an expression of the realization of the principle of equality can demand from 
all the rights it interacts with immediate realization. The only problem is that 
States might or might not have an obligation to implement affirmative action 
policies, depending on the normative rank of General Comments.  
As we discussed before, racial affirmative action, as well as gender related 
affirmative action are mandatory due to their inclusion in treaties. But what 
happens to affirmative action originating from other grounds, such as 
language, religion, property, age, sexual orientation or other status? States face 
increasable demands to prove their non-discrimination functioning apparatus 
in the field of employment and social rights for young people, LGBT rights or 
even for people with an apparently controversial health status, such as HIV 
carriers. Are these vulnerable groups entitled to the preferential element of 
affirmative action and is such entitlement offered by the international human 
rights system? 
	  
2.3 Affirmative action: a variable obligation 
 
Human rights treaties inherit the nature of international law governed by the 
pacta sunt servanda rule, a simple idea based on the fact that States are 
obligated by the treaties they ratify.68 Treaties, including human rights treaties, 
are governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 1969 
that in article 26 explains that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. There is a blurred line in 
contemporary international law between binding and non-binding norms due 
to an erratic State practice but the presumption that States consciously 
differentiate between the so called soft law and treaty obligations is still major 
and so is the difference between a legally binding document and a trend or 
state practice.69 Are General Comments and Recommendations thus, legally 
binding? The answer seems to be both yes and no. 
Human rights bodies, as generators of Comments and Recommendations, act 
as interpreters of human rights and may originate “subsequent practice in the 
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69 Shelton, D, Normative Hierarchy in International Law [comments](2006), American 
Journal Of International Law,(2  pp. 291-323), p. 320-321. 
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sense of article 31.3.b of the Vienna Convention” 70 although this could also be 
disputed. Is this subsequent practice legally binding? Some believe General 
Comments and Recommendations are simply guidelines for the 
implementation of the right in questions while other part of the doctrine agrees 
that they have “considerable legal weight”.71 Human rights bodies have been 
criticized for not following the interpretation doctrine set by the Vienna 
Convention.72 Their authority to conduct such interpretation has nevertheless, 
not been put into question sufficiently. If we take for example the case of the 
CEDAW, part V of the Convention discusses the establishment of the 
Committee and its main characteristics. Article 17 declares that “for the 
purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the present 
Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women”. If we accept that international obligations 
derive from treaties then we can conclude that the only function that States 
agreed to allow the Committee to possess is a monitoring function of the 
implementation process. Article 21 does indeed empower the Committee to 
make “suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of 
reports and information received from the States Parties” but are these 
suggestions equivalent to an interpretation power or are these suggestions 
legally binding as long as they refer to what the Committee was legally and 
bindingly mandate to do in article 17, that is, to implement the Convention? 
The same authority to make suggestions is attributed to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in article 9 of the CERD, to the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in article 39 of the 
specific Convention. As stressed by the International Law Association in a 
2004 Report, “comments, and general comments and recommendations of the 
treaty bodies are to be accorded considerable importance as the 
pronouncement of body expert in the issues covered by the treaty; they are not 
in themselves formally binding interpretations of the treaty”.73 The same paper 
also establishes that “none of the human rights treaties explicitly confers on 
the relevant treaty bodies the power to adopt binding interpretations of the 
treaties, and the practice of at least some States suggest that this power has not 
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been conferred implicitly”.74 In line with all of the above, we can conclude 
that affirmative action in the sphere of the rights and guarantees accorded by 
the ICCPR and ICESC does not appear as a strong obligation for States but 
rather a facultative option, a mechanism to otherwise redress inequality and 
discrimination. In connection with race, gender and disabilities, affirmative 
action has a much stronger status and its weight originates from its inclusion in 
the specialized treaties- CEDAW, CRPD and CERD.  
Within the international human rights legal design, we observe thus that some 
groups and discrimination grounds have been regarded as to possess a higher 
priority of redress than others. Nevertheless, for these specific groups, their 
relevant Covenant provides a wide range of rights to be enforced with a non-
discrimination attachment, correcting thus the legal void created by the non-
inclusion of affirmative action in the ICCPR and ICESCR.  
Affirmative action is therefore a variable obligation and that implies that a 
State is obligated to adopt affirmative action policies only in regards to those 
vulnerabilities contemplated by a human rights instrument and following the 
limitations and guidelines of those treaties. The extended nature of affirmative 
action derived from the interpretations of human rights bodies and of the 
scholarship can help States achieve equality easily by making the 
implementation of these measures more effective. Nevertheless States enjoy a 
valid and legitimate margin of appreciation in regards to the characteristics of 
special measures that are not contemplated in the texts of international human 
rights instruments.   
Below, I have constructed a table that delimitates the obligation and margin of 
appreciation for each treaty to highlight that States have an obligation to adopt 
affirmative action policies in limited circumstances and when that happens, the 
obligation for those to be temporary is predominant. In the field of disabilities, 
affirmative action can be permanent since the temporality is not discussed by 
the CRPD. Finally, there is an extensive margin of appreciation to either adopt 
or not, and if so to what degree and in what fields, in relation to the ICCPR 
and ICESCR and the rights provided by both instruments. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid, para 18, pg 5	  
32	  
	  
 
Treaty                Obligation  Margin of Appreciation 
CEDAW • Adoption of  measure 
• Temporary Nature 
  
• Permanent Nature in 
relation to maternity 
• Field of 
implementation and 
right to equalize 
CERD • Adoption of measure 
• Temporary Nature 
• Sole purpose of ensuring 
equal enjoyment and exercise 
of human rights 
• Field of 
implementation and 
rights to equalize 
• Justification and 
terminology applied 
CRPD • Adoption of measure 
• Purpose of substantive 
equality 
• No indication of duration 
• Temporary or 
permanent nature 
• Fields, 
implementation, 
terminology, etc. 
ICESCR • No obligation • Full spectrum 
• Can trigger immediate 
realization 
ICCPR • No obligation • Full spectrum 
 
	  
Chapter III. Equality and non-discrimination in international human rights 
system 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental concepts for this paper for 
two reasons. First of all, the right to equality represents a challenge to the 
legitimacy of affirmative action when it is possessed by those individuals 
outside a vulnerable or disadvantaged group as they can claim access to the 
same resources, industries or goods that are being redistributed in favor of a 
discriminated group. Such legal claim is performed in virtue of their own right 
to equality. Secondly, the right to equality is at the same time the origin of 
affirmative action as it gives States the opportunity to redress and compensate 
for discrimination in certain sectors or in relation to disadvantaged groups. If 
the first interaction between the concepts presupposes that those outside the 
vulnerable group are in a position of enjoyment of their right to equality and a 
potential conflict originates when they exercise it, the second interaction is 
based on the hypothesis that equality is for the disadvantaged group yet to be 
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achieved. The right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination are two 
separate but strongly interconnected concepts for the international human 
rights system as they appear in all treaties and their reiteration purports 
significance as to their extraordinary importance and relation with other 
human rights. Equality is mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, both 
in the preamble and article 1 under the “Purposes of the UN” section, in the 
UDHR and all Covenants discussed throughout this paper.  Equality, within 
the international law arena is a purpose, a principle, a right and a test in the 
realization of all other rights.  One of the most traditional reflections upon the 
nature of equality is still Judge Tanaka’s Dissenting Opinion in the South 
West Africa Cases that distinguishes “the natural law character” of this 
principle and its philosophical connections to freedom and justice and alludes 
to Aristotle’s justitia commutativa and distributiva to explain that “what is 
equal is to be treated equally and what is different is to be treated differently”. 
75  Judge Tanaka referred thus in 1966 to the possibility of differential 
treatment as an inherent facet of equality, recognizing that equality is non-
mechanical but rather a metaphysical concept.76 
Just as affirmative action, neither equality nor discrimination are static 
concepts but they have been rather evolving and a simple look for example at 
GR 25 of the CEDAW Committee or GC 20 of the CESCR Committee brings 
forward the diverse types of equality and discrimination dominating the world 
of human rights.  As I will explain below, formal equality and substantive 
equality known as de jure and de facto equality are the main derivates used by 
human rights bodies in relation to affirmative action. Discrimination is also 
contemplated in different forms as systemic, direct or indirect. As Jarlath 
Clifford summarized it “there are different conceptions of equality that apply 
in different contexts [and] claiming a violation of the rights to non-
discrimination or equality before the law thus often triggers an evaluation of 
one or more conceptions of equality”.77  
Moreover, the dynamic between equality and discrimination is not solely 
limited to legal aspects and “to engage in the most difficult debates regarding 
the meaning and application of equality means developing principles and 
doctrines that speak to institutional dynamics of discrimination, the 
intersection of public and private normativity, the intergenerational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/46/4945.pdf, as consulted on May 9th 2015, 
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76 Ibid, pg.303 
77 The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, ed. by Dina Shelton, First.Ed 
(2013), Oxford University Press, see Jarlath Clifford, Equality, pg.426. 
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reproduction of inequality, process values such as democracy, citizenship, 
participation, transparency, accountability in decision-making, and 
mechanisms for reinforcing both individual and collective agency and 
empowerment”.78  In this chapter I will thus proceed to analyze the main types 
of equality and discrimination used by human rights bodies while also 
discussing alternatives presented in the literature and the implications of each 
concept in relation to affirmative action. For example, Clifford talks about an 
alternative to the traditional formal and substantive equality and discusses 
fluid un-isolated classifications of the equality spectrum such as (a) equality as 
consistent treatment, (b) equality of opportunity, (c) equality of outcomes and 
(d) transformative equality. 79 
Although legal aspects will be preferred, especially those related to affirmative 
action, philosophical aspects of equality will also be briefly considered in an 
attempt to approach equality holistically and not diminish the importance of its 
association with justice and freedom. The egalitarian theory of John Rawls as 
well as Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality and distributive justice will be 
analyzed in relation to State measures aimed at combating discrimination.  
 
3.2 Formal or de jure equality 
 
Formal equality is a rigid concept that fails to take into consideration broader 
patterns and social circumstances or even differences between individuals and 
is represented by an idea that similarity and identical treatment that should be 
reflected in both legal premise and factual outcomes surrounding an 
individual.80 Formal equality is what Clifford meant to explain when he 
described equality as consistent treatment, a traditional, basic and narrow idea 
of equality that deems personal circumstances as irrelevant but has one 
important advantage: it protects individuals from an arbitrary distribution of 
goods or resources and ensures equality before the law.81 Nevertheless, 
Clifford warns that laws that are morally wrong can by virtue of formal 
equality be applied repeatedly and equally between individuals, deepening 
thus societal inequalities. 
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79 Supra note 77, pg.426 
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Formal equality has been criticized for implying neutrality in the legal system 
and operating on the idea that if the law is applied equally that will generate 
social equality.82 The concept has also been criticized for implying that the 
State is neutral in its interventions for not becoming involved in for example 
how employers choose candidates, making it thus an institutionalized concept 
that disregards the public-private binary.83  
Formal equality also referred to as de jure equality implies certain obligations 
for States, in particular that their laws “do not discriminate through 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences”.84 
 In relation to affirmative action the concept of preferences or preferential 
treatment is particularly important, since it is one of its main elements and one 
that determines an incompatibility between special measures on any ground 
and formal equality. This restriction of not allowing preferential treatment in 
the legislative process is what sometimes makes de jure equality become de 
facto discrimination.85 Narrowly interpreted notions of formal equality also 
reject compensatory forms of affirmative action due to the distinction made by 
these policies between individuals. The European Commission sees formal 
equality as a model constructed by a liberal and symmetrical approach that 
focuses on “equality for individuals, formal neutrality and procedural justice” 
and that is influenced by a meritocratic approach.86 Formal equality has been 
the fundamental emphasis of the European Community’s equality law 
although throughout the years the concept has evolved into one with 
substantive equality infiltrates due to the fact that the Commission itself 
recognized that formal equality does not respond to societal realities.87  
Today, reconciling the disadvantages of formal equality with the risk of 
substantive equality that will be discussed in the following pages is a 
balancing act that gives way to equality of opportunity, “a blend of form and 
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substance” that defines the middle ground that the EU has chosen to reflect in 
its contemporary legislation.88  
As signaled by Cuenca, most European constitutions such as the Spanish one 
and most strongly the German one only recognize formal equality by usually 
containing a clause formulated as “ citizens are equal before the law” and thus, 
conceiving formal equality as a fundamental right is not problematic.89 She 
continues by explaining that it is difficult to conceive de facto equality as a 
fundamental rights due to the clashes of this principle with formal equality that 
has been dominating constitutional laws and that in the German case the 
reconciliation of both concepts has been brought to the Constitutional Court 
that allowed for differential treatment using the socialism principle.90 
Cuenca also underlines the decision of the Constitutional Court of Italy 
(215/1987) that declared that formal and substantive equality are 
interdependent and that formal equality does not prohibit a differentiated 
normative treatment as long as such preference is based on a reasonable 
motive and that a different economical and social status of individual is indeed 
a strong motive.91 Similarly, the Spanish Constitutional Court also recognized 
that the Constitution contemplates formal equality but that allows for 
exceptions as long as such exceptions are a means to achieve substantive 
equality.92 
I also believe the practice of Constitutional Courts (CC) to be highly relevant 
to affirmative action, because CCs are mandated to verify the legality of every 
policy and norm adopted within domestic laws. Thus, if an affirmative action 
policy is constructed with the purpose of achieving a different type of equality 
than the one envisioned by the Constitution, such norm might be declared null 
despite international pressures, until the Constitutional Court in question 
declares a potential compatibility.  
In 2005 Slovakia’s Constitutional Court rejected as unconstitutional 
affirmative action clauses of its Anti-discrimination Act related to the 
preferential treatment of ethnic and racial groups due to the fact that it “it 
interferes in an unconstitutional manner with legal certainty in legal 
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relationships” but also due to the unlimited duration of the measures.93  The 
Slovakian CC did so despite its obligations under the CERD.  
The United States faced numerous cases where States decided to amend their 
Constitutions and to ban race or sex affirmative action in their education sector 
and the US Supreme Court decided in the recent Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action(2014) that such amendment is legally permissible.94 
In the concurring judgment, judge Breyer explained that “I agree that, in 
implementing the Constitution’s equality instruction, government decision-
makers may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and exclusion, 
for the former are more likely to prove consistent with the basic constitutional 
obligation that the law respect each individual equally” upholding thus a 
preference for formal equality in relation to affirmative action policies.95  
Formal equality is thus a concept that is rarely compatible with affirmative 
action policies due to the fact that it implies that the law should not accord 
preferential treatment to any individual, but the same identical treatment and 
starting point to all. Nevertheless, international human rights law envisioned 
substantive equality in the form of equality of opportunity and results, two 
concepts that are likely to correct the disadvantages of formal equality.  
 
 
3.3 Substantive or de facto equality 
 
Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, operates with the hypothesis that 
discrimination is embedded in society and that individuals are not in a position 
of similarity or identical status and allows for preferential treatment in order 
for equality to be reflected in the realities of a community. Substantive 
equality encompasses generally two ideas: equality of opportunity and equality 
of results.96 Equality of opportunity is understood by Clifford to imply 
redistributive approaches but not in a utilitarian fashion but simply to allow 
individuals a similar starting point in their pursuit of accessing goods, 
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industries and services.97 The same author believes that equality of outcome 
goes beyond offering the same starting point and ensures via affirmative action 
policies that previously discouraged or disadvantaged individuals factually 
obtain resources.  
The doctrine of equality is slightly inconsistent with categorizing substantive 
equality and its two subtypes but the practical implications of the concepts 
appear to be the same. Substantive equality requires State interventions and 
pro-activity beyond the legislative power, involving all branches of the States, 
especially the Executive. To my understanding, substantive equality is above 
all an administration of equality. The shift in the adoption of substantive 
equality within domestic systems and the abandonment of formal equality 
within constitutional law has also been signaled to reflect the replacement of 
classic liberalism with a social welfare governmental design.98 If formal 
equality demonstrates a government that conceives discrimination as an 
“exception and an irrational aberration”, substantive equality believes that 
discrimination is “systemic” and assumes responsibility for the well-being of 
individuals by adopting “remedial and preventive” policies.99 Nevertheless, 
implementing substantive equality is not an easy balancing act because “to 
carry substantive equality to its logical conclusion would be to challenge some 
of the fundamental economic and political pillars of modern society” and if 
such challenge takes place in the courtroom, as it mostly happens in the 
common law system, that is something that “judges are not planning to do”. 100 
 In civil law, the reconciliation of the two concepts is as difficult. If we take 
for example the Spanish Constitution and the doctrine of the Spanish CC, they 
do not recognize that equality is envisioned by the Constitution as “normative 
singularization” and that there is a constitutional right to be treated differently 
and favorably in certain circumstances equivalent- and as strong as -the right 
to be treated equally and to not be discriminated against.101 The Spanish 
constitutional doctrine reflects that the responsibility to decide when to apply a 
different legal and normative treatment to certain groups belongs singularly to 
the legislative that similarly to the Italian, has indeed given way to substantive 
equality by allowing affirmative action.102 
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The importance of national Constitutions to endorse and promote substantive 
equality and to amend the traditional formal equality focus has been signaled 
in the scholarship. A 2013 study that analyses gender constitutionalization in 
Greece warns that the endorsement of formal or substantive equality is crucial 
in achieving gender equality at a societal level and that “constitutional and 
statutory reforms in a number of countries have allowed for the adoption of 
positive measures”.103  The same study explains that affirmative action became 
possible in Italy and France because of constitutional amendments that shifted 
the notion of equality from formalistic to substantive. The South African 
Constitution also embraces a more substantive facet of equality, with a 
specific clause for affirmative action, making it more permissible to 
implement such policies, although in the South African case such a model has 
proven to be common ground for legal disputes.104  
 
The experience of substantive constitutional pre-commitments to affirmative 
action has been discussed in the field of gender in a comparative study 
between Canada, the European Union and the United States where Totten 
refuted Sunstein’s105 hypothesis that the introduction of such clauses within a 
constitution stabilizes the political sphere.106 In the same paper, Totten proves 
that in the case of the United States which adopts a more formalistic 
Constitution, the political debate has been narrowed by such pre-
commitments. The work of Totten and Sunstein are equally important because 
building up a link between affirmative action, constitutionalism and political 
debates is essential to the realization of equality and the progress of 
constitutionalizing modern concepts of equality. 
The importance of the constitutionalization of a formalistic or substantive 
equality has been also signaled by O'Cinneide that says that “for many years 
the US Equal Protection Clause lay largely dormant, with its interpretation by 
the US Supreme Court depriving it of real substantive content” and that within 
common law generally, equality has rarely been given a substantive 
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produce.107 Affirmative action and substantive equality interact mildly, as 
substantive equality requires a position of similarity in either opportunities or 
results and is a form of “coercive imposition of quotas […] that bring about 
greater fulfillment of formal equality of opportunity”.108 Affirmative action 
policies can thus not only help individuals at all societal levels to enjoy better 
opportunities to access resources but also help the realization of formal 
equality. Nevertheless, the scholarship is predominantly concerned that 
substantive equality might not be sufficient to account for the various 
economical and philosophical implications of equality as justice and human 
dignity. As Sheppard suggested “the concept of substantive equality was 
essential in taking us beyond a formal equality that looked only to procedural 
equal treatment and not to equality of substantive outcomes, focusing on 
effects alone may not provide us with sufficient insight into the institutional 
and systemic reproduction of inequality”.109 
Having provided a brief description of both formal and substantive equality, I 
will now proceed to investigate the predominance of both concepts within the 
international human rights framework and determine if there is an obligation 
for States to fulfill a certain typology of equality. After that, I will also 
examine the concept of discrimination which will allow me to ascertain the 
relationship between affirmative action and equality in the last chapter. 
	  
3.4 Substantive and formal equality as human rights standards 
 
Inside the international human rights system, the concept of equality can be 
traced back to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 when Japan proposed that 
the Covenant of the League of Nations would include a racial equality 
clause.110 American president Woodrow Wilson opposed and blocked such 
recognitions and it is not until 1929 when the Declaration of the International 
Rights of Man is adopted and equality reemerges and grounds for 
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discrimination are formulated as a prohibition.111 The travaux preparatoires of 
the Charter of the UN show that Britain, the Soviet Union and the US were 
initially pleased to leave out any mention of racial equality, as China 
suggested.112 South Africa, Panama, Cuba and other States along with the civil 
society pressured for the inclusion of human rights in the Charter. 113 As we 
progress throughout the history of human rights, we step into the travaux 
preparatoires of the UDHR that show that equality was strongly envisioned as 
formalistic in the sense of “equality before the law”.114 Article 7 of the UDHR 
reads “all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to equal protection of the law” but it has been suggested that the drafters never 
elucidated the meaning of this clause and whether it implies a positive equality 
or simply a prohibition of discrimination (negative equality) that goes hand in 
hand with article 2 of the Declaration.115 
 
All international human rights instruments contain a reference to the right to 
equality, sometimes denominated equality principle, as its positive connotation 
is derived from the prohibition of discrimination as a negative obligation. The 
CEDAW mentions equality between men and women throughout its articles 
although the introduction to the Convention states that the purpose is to 
achieve full equality. The Convention also obligates States to introduce such 
principle within Constitutions and to ensure its practical realization. Article 4 
that regulates affirmative action provides that such policies should ensure de 
facto equality between men and women which suggests that States have an 
international obligation to ensure substantive equality. Finally, GR 25 
establishes that affirmative action should aim at realizing both de jure and de 
facto equality and that “purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not 
sufficient to achieve women’s de facto equality with men”. The scholarship 
has also put forward the idea that affirmative action in the field of gender, 
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requires a type of transformative equality in the sense that States are obligated 
to combat existing stereotypes of societal situations that maintain gender 
imbalances by transforming private and public institutions.116  
 
Nevertheless, transformative equality, as part of substantive equality, requires 
an assessment of power relations, economic and cultural dynamics and an 
understanding of the systemic nature of inequalities.117 If anything, I believe 
transformative equality is the equivalent of holistic equality in the sense that it 
manages to take into account all aspects and dynamics at all levels of an 
individual and its environment in order to combat the obstacles that diminish 
the fulfillment of human rights. Although such conceptualization exists, it is 
not yet reflected by the realities of the legal constitutional systems.  
 
For example, a transformative approach in the field of gender requires a 
normative understanding for women and their biological and social 
programming and uniqueness. 118 Such an approach would ideally be reflected 
in an egalitarian economic model. Although economic egalitarianism is a 
noble aspiration in the field of gender, the current capitalism influenced 
approach to gender makes it hard for affirmative action to create more 
opportunities due to meritocracy. Nevertheless, meritocracy and egalitarianism 
are two competing principles that have been recently proven to hypothetically 
coexist within a stable society.119 It is thus the role of the State, required by the 
promise of substantive equality to intervene and regulate reconciliations 
between a meritocratic approach and an egalitarian outcome. Nevertheless, 
affirmative action policies have been criticized for infringing the meritocratic 
principle and meritocracy seems to remain the preferred rule to economic 
decisions and models as opposed to the equity principle.120 
 
In the field of racial equality, the CERD mentions the aspiration of “equal 
enjoyment or exercise of human rights” that has been interpreted in the GR 32 
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to be the equivalent of a combination between formal and substantive equality. 
The purpose of the CERD is to secure that all racial representations enjoy an 
adequate advancement of their rights aimed at correcting “de facto inequalities 
resulting from the circumstances of history”.121 Channelling Castles and 
Davidson122, a rather brutal paper of 2009 affirms that although formal 
equality is demonstrated within modern States, minorities have yet to become 
full citizens of States when their inclusion will not only be political but socio-
economical and that racial differentiation seems to be one of the dominating 
principles of Western foundations.123 The same paper argues that the 
unfulfillment of racial equality is caused by the defective human rights 
tradition influenced by mostly “white scholars” from Aristotle to 
Enlightenment figures such as Voltaire, Kant Hume and “the enlightened 
liberals in the United States such as Benjamin Franklin, John Hancock, and 
James Madison”.124  
 
Despite its result and prominent racial tensions internationally, a global legal 
obligation to enact affirmative action policies temporarily until de facto 
equality has been achieved exists and upon investigation, no State has 
expressed a reservation to such requirements expressed by the Covenant.125 
Although racial affirmative action have been criticized to be seeking over-
achievement, it is still a predominant thought that in a globalized world it is 
much needed because “affirmative action has the potential to catalyze 
important conversations about national identity and what it means to fit into 
increasingly diverse, multicultural societies”.126 
 
A common reading of both GR 32 and 20 of the CERD Committee suggests 
that special attention must be paid to women who face racial discrimination. 
Intersectional special measures have not been proposed by any of the human 
rights bodies although the complex nature of multiple discriminations has been 
acknowledged and States have been encourage to report regarding 
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intersectionality.127 Given that States fulfill their obligations in singular patters 
established by a specific Convention, it is questionable whether for example a 
State party to both CEDAW and CERD has an obligation to adopt 
intersectional affirmative action. The same idea can be applied to cross-cuts 
between disabilities and gender or disabilities and race. Intersectional 
measures have been recently demanded and the significance of multi-
dimensional discrimination has been understood to “unravel the complex 
processes that (re)produce interlocking systems of oppression and inequality 
within specific organization”. 128 A study in the Dutch police force recently 
showed that “in their attempts to increase their status [individuals] might 
inadvertently reproduce those same discursive and material structures which 
perpetuate their own marginalization” and that “meanings and actions of 
employees feed back into structures of inequality along intersecting identity 
axes, reproducing rather than challenging them”.129 The difficulties of 
intersectional discrimination and marginalization go consequently beyond 
public or even the private sphere as they affect an individual’s actions, self-
identity and transferred energy put into motion to challenge several 
vulnerabilities at a time.  
 
Although the goal of substantive equality is thus an obligation for States to 
ensure that an individual is given the same opportunities and/or results, 
regardless of the good or service in question, the individual’s particular 
circumstance is highly relevant to the effectiveness of an affirmative action 
policy. Substantive equality should demand evidence-based and circumstantial 
policies and social remedies because singular forms of action may not be 
sufficient to achieve de facto equality. The most alarming thing is that in 
relation to a person facing multiple discriminations, we may never know why 
such policies fail despite governmental efforts to comply with singular 
obligations. 
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In relation to the CRPD, article 5.4 that is related to affirmative action 
establishes that in the field of disabilities, “accelerating or achieving de facto 
equality” is the dominating operating principle and goal. Article 5 also 
recognizes formal equality and establishes a principle of “equal protection and 
benefit” from the law. Moreover, the Convention declares in its article 3(e) 
and (g) that the governing principles of the treaty are equality and opportunity 
and equality between men and women. Affirmative action in the field of 
disabilities is not mandatorily temporary, as the Convention does not mention 
the duration of these “specific” measures. In relation to formal equality, we 
also find relevant the CRPD’s Committee GC 1 that is dedicated to explaining 
the meaning of equality before the law for persons with disabilities.130  
 
GC 1 raises the standard of formal equality accorded by article 12 of the 
Convention by not allowing “discriminatory denial of legal capacity, but, 
rather, requires that support be provided in the exercise of legal capacity”. 
Legal capacity goes hand in hand with formal equality in the sense that it is an 
expression of the recognition that the law offers to individuals, deeming them 
fit to exercise human rights. GC 1 also suggests that “the right to equal 
recognition before the law implies that legal capacity is a universal attribute 
inherent in all persons by virtue of their humanity and must be upheld for 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others”.131  
It is unclear whether affirmative action in the field of disabilities will target 
assistance in the exercise of legal capacity but article 12 of the CRPD seems 
definitive in obligating States to take a wide range of measures to insure legal 
capacity and the highest standard of formal equality for people with 
disabilities. If such affirmative action plans will be envisioned, they will most 
likely be legislative and also peculiar due to the nonexistence of a 
compensation element and a great difficulty in assessing the proportionality of 
such measures. Unlike gender and race, that are static and rather static 
concepts, disabilities can take different forms from cognitive to psychological 
or the most obvious way, a physical disability and determining the best 
methods of assistance in exercising legal capacity should be circumstantial. 
The constitutional framework of a State in question is also important for the 
enactment of such special measures. National Constitutions that have 
explicitly mentioned equality in the field of disabilities are the Chinese one, 
the German one, the Constitution of Fiji as well as South African 
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Constitution.132 In relation to civil and political rights or economic, social and 
cultural, we have established that affirmative action is not mentioned in 
neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR. Nevertheless, the type of equality 
promoted by the Covenants is important due to the fact that States might elect 
to enact affirmative action policies that aim at the realization of one of the 
rights contained in these treaties. Article 26 of the ICCPR establishes the right 
to formal equality in the sense of “equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law”. Nevertheless, the HRC in GC 18 has interpreted that “the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not 
mean identical treatment in every instance” and in that sense it mentions the 
protection conferred to people below the age of 18 and pregnant women in 
relation to the death penalty. 133 The same GC allows for affirmative action 
programs but the goal in the field of civil and political rights seems to be to 
“correct” social imbalances and discriminations. Finally, GC 28 that refers to 
equality between men and women in the sphere of the rights protected by the 
ICCPR is also formalistic, referencing the same idea of equality as article 26 
of the Covenant. 
The ICESCR contains a broader equality to be achieved. In its article 7 related 
to the right to work, it promotes “equal remuneration and equal opportunity to 
be promoted in employment”. Article 13 promotes “equally accessible” higher 
education”. The type of equality promoted by the text of the treaty is visibly 
more result-oriented and less formal than the one in the ICCPR. General 
Comment 20 of the CESCR Committee confirms that the Covenant has 
envisioned a substantive equality and that “requires paying sufficient attention 
to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead 
of merely comparing the formal treatment of individuals in similar 
situations”.134 Therefore, affirmative action is not an obligation under the 
ICESCR but policies adopted in order to guarantee and realize the rights of 
this Covenant can target broader inequalities and be more result-oriented than 
the ones in the area of civil and political rights due to the difference in the 
conceptualization of equality. 
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3.5 Direct, indirect and systemic discrimination 
 
Direct discrimination is an idea related to the concept of formal equality in the 
sense that it reflects a differential treatment of an individual or group based on 
certain characteristics called discrimination grounds. 135 Such discrimination 
grounds are within the international law system “race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status”.136 Differential treatment can be mirrored in legislation but also 
refers to the conduct of public authorities or “or by private employers or 
organisations, such as through differential pay, delayed promotion or the 
refusal of entry to public amenities”.137  
Affirmative action measures that target direct discrimination are usually 
legislative efforts to equalize the legal stand and status of individuals and 
comply with an immediate international obligation. Direct discrimination 
requires an element of differentiation with “another person in a similar 
situation” but can “also include(s) detrimental acts or omissions on the basis of 
prohibited grounds where there is no comparable similar situation”.138 In a 
situation of an affirmative action giving disproportional or unconditional 
preferential treatment to an individual or a group, direct discrimination is what 
could be claimed by the opposing group. For instance, if an employment 
policy accords unconditional preferential treatment to women, and solely 
because they are women they would be favored for a position that a man is 
equally qualified for, then such man can claim direct discrimination and such 
policy would have a reversed discrimination effect. 
The second form of discrimination is indirect discrimination represented by a 
broader understanding of discommodity. Direct discrimination, by its strong 
link with formal equality “does little to address the redistributive and 
restructuring goals of equality”.139 Indirect discrimination responds to this 
issue by acting as a “complement to formal equality, or equality as 
consistency”.140 Indirect discrimination provides that even apparently unbiased 
laws and practices or equal legal treatment can, in reality, generate 
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disadvantages for some groups or individuals.141 Affirmative action policies 
that seek to achieve substantive equality and thus combat broader patterns of 
discrimination have been understood to be part of a wider narrative of States’ 
obligations represented by a positive duty to promote equality.142 Besides the 
element of neutrality, indirect discrimination requires an examination of the 
justification behind a policy that justifies a differential treatment or result.143 
Affirmative action that aims at combating indirect discrimination goes beyond 
the legislative and requires administrative intervention, coordination with non-
State actors and allocation of budgetary resources. For example, in the field of 
gender discrimination, direct discrimination could be redressed by modifying a 
national Constitution and amending the legislative framework as to provide 
men and women with the same rights. But such efforts might not be sufficient 
to resolve stereotyping and respond to societal realities. This is resolved by 
substantive affirmative action that approaches gender inequalities holistically, 
determines patterns between the individual and its dynamic with public and 
private institutions and seeks a redistribution and reallocation of opportunities. 
However, it should not to be understood that substantive equality only implies 
economical interventions and solutions.  
A holistic approach requires evidence-based approaches, for example, 
enacting media laws that seek to empower women and combat media 
stereotypes and double standards. Another example would be equalizing 
gender rights legislatively by sanctioning domestic violence but at the same 
time providing training to government officials that interact with domestic 
violence victims such as doctors and the police force in order to ensure the 
best response to such a phenomenon. Indirect discrimination requires thus 
policies with multiple targets and aims and a complex understanding of 
discrimination and all the factors that generate and perpetrate it. The last form 
of discrimination that merits clarification is the so called systemic 
discrimination. It is defined by the CESCR Committee as “pervasive and 
persistent and deeply entrenched in social behaviour”.144 
Systemic discrimination may include but not be limited to indirect 
discrimination and it is envisioned as a large-scale attitude revealed in “the 
creation, perpetuation or reinforcement of persistent patterns of inequality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid 
142 Ibid, pg. 26 
143 Supra, note 72, pg. 70	  
144 Supra note 27, para 12 
49	  
	  
among disadvantaged groups”.145 Systemic discrimination assumes that there 
are plural causes to a situation of discrimination and it recognizes the greater 
involvement of the private sphere in the perpetuity of disadvantages.146  
To my understanding, there is a great similarity between indirect and systemic 
discrimination and the practical difference between one and the other is hard 
to comprehend. In practice systemic discrimination seems to be more related 
to the employment area.147 Nevertheless, as the terminology suggests, 
systemic discrimination is related to the operational values of a system, as a 
whole. That implies that systemic discrimination is a multi-dimensional 
concept and should not be limited to the labor sphere. In the US, systemic 
discrimination has been referred to as “unintentional” and “broad enough to 
encompass cases of disparate impact involv(ing) a claim that a facially neutral 
employment practice—such as […] a criminal background check policy—has 
an adverse impact on a protected class and cannot be justified by business 
necessity”.148 Systemic discrimination remains nevertheless, a legally 
ambiguous term that will need further clarification in both domestic and 
transnational legislation.  
 
3.6 Philosophical approaches to equality: Rawls and Dworkin 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, equality is not a concept that 
can or should be limited to legal perceptions. It is a notion that transcends the 
legal sphere into socio-economical as well as philosophical areas. In order to 
understand equality and its importance for our society, I have decided to 
briefly introduce the ideas of two of the most valuable legal and political 
philosophers whose ideas have inspired debate and progress in the field of 
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redistributive approaches to justice. The methodologies of both Rawls and 
Dworkin, both rigorous and at time difficult to absorb into a legal context will 
be overlooked and their main substantive ideas will be presented in an attempt 
to broaden our understanding of equality and formulate an objective 
conclusion. 
For Ronald Dworkin, equality is to be understood if we can identify its forms. 
He identifies subcategories of equality of welfare and equality of resources to 
be two important types but admits that these “two abstract conceptions of 
equality […] do not exhaust the possible theories of equality, even in 
combination”.149 When contemplating equality of welfare, Dworkin suggests 
that it should go beyond “putting the same figures” into people’s bank 
accounts but instead make their lives “equally desirable” but also proves that it 
is a weaker concept that we might have thought due to the variable of 
walfarism.150 Dworkin relates the concept of equality to preferences, tastes and 
human uniqueness and implies that “it is an essential feature of life’s 
performance that persons define for themselves what gives value to life […] 
and it is contrary to this performance for officials to decide an objective list of 
elements of a good life and distribute resources accordingly”.151  
The idea of equality of welfare for Dworkin is related to the self-envisioned 
image of success and the possibility of governments to treat  
conceptualizations of what it means to be successful equally and it is believed 
to not be sufficient in order to express the meaning of equality in issues of 
distribution.152 Equality of resources is a concept also related to a person’s 
bigger picture in the sense that a fair distribution for Dworkin means that it 
takes into account people’s ambitions but at the same time translates into the 
idea that “people should not have less income simply in consequence of less 
native talent”.153 Alexander Brown interprets Dworkin’s idea of equality in a 
transnational sphere and applies it to a global community level only to realize 
that the targets of official development assistance and generally achieving the 
MDG’s are not based on an equal concern for individuals.154 Equal concern 
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and respect for citizens and their life trajectory has been defined by Dworkin 
as a right but nevertheless an abstract one because it represents a “virtue” of 
the sovereign and fundamental to political morality.155 
Rawls on the other hand discusses equality in a much more confronting way, 
juggling between idealistic conceptions and obstructing realities. He appears 
to dismiss the human trajectory that Dworkin embraces and prefers to seek 
political implications for equality. There are three types of equality for Rawls: 
fundamental equality, political equality and socio-economic equality.156  
The first two types are somehow attainable. Fundamental equality implies “a 
moral claim and equal worth” of individuals and political equality centers on 
the idea that such claims should be directed towards institutions that bear the 
responsibility of according equal worth.157 However, in the sphere of socio-
economic equality things get complicated. Rawls advocates for a system that 
seeks less to redistribute and more to initially fairly distribute.158 Nevertheless, 
Rawls is not naïve and does not preach compassionate politics. He admits that 
if the standard of equality is practically unachievable the question of 
redistribution should then be how far should we let it fall away from the 
standard?.159 Rawls idea of equality is reduced to a simple and contemporary 
mind set: “even in a well-ordered society, we are likely to see individuals who 
are motivated by a "me-first" outlook rather than any deep sense of 
reciprocity”.160 Finally, it is important to mention that scholars have been 
debating whether the Rawlsian theory of equality is compatible with 
affirmative action and have suggested that because justice means fairness for 
Rawls, that means that strong types of affirmative action such as quotas might 
be incompatible with his views, although it is reported that Rawls discussed a 
potential application of these measures in his lectures, not his writings.161 
By briefly introducing the ideas of equality of Dworkin and Rawls I wanted to 
suggest that the main types of equality that the international human rights 
system is operating with might not be sufficient in order to achieve non-
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discrimination and a fair distribution of resources. The idea of substitutive 
equality that seems to dominate the discourse in favor of affirmative action is 
characterized by a movement of redistribution that Rawls rejected in his 
works. Moreover, it fails to take into account Dworkin’s concern for 
preferences, tastes and self-conceptualization of individual success as well as 
leave out his idea of equal concern for citizens. As I have discussed earlier, 
affirmative action might need to employ transformative equality in order to 
diminish discrimination and under-representation but that requires a 
readjustment to making macro-economic decisions based on equity rather than 
meritocracy. As our Western societies are more and more capitalist, the idea of 
equal concern in an economic sense becomes less and less attainable and as 
Rawls suggested equality is corrupted when we are aiming for redistribution of 
resources. Nevertheless, an equitable initial distribution in a capitalistic society 
seems to represent utopia and if equal concern means more than formal 
equality, if it means that governments should be interested in how they treat 
citizens rather than how the effects of the law affects the population, it is hard 
to believe that equality of welfare will be ever achieved. 
 
International human rights law, when putting forward the legal standards of 
equality should envision a concept that represents the social journey of an 
individual and customizes its response for his talents, opportunities, initial 
condition and potential barriers to his full holistic development. Moreover, it 
should take into account the difficulties of achieving equality and what that 
implies for the reordering of the economic model of States, that each have 
their own circumstances, culture, history and political peculiarities. A 
substantive concept of equality that will be identically implemented into all 
States and generate the same levels of opportunities for citizens needs to be 
micro and macro adjusted to fit the socio-economical context of both the 
private and public sphere while always operating with the variable of human 
uniqueness. Today, formal equality seems to disregards differences while 
substantive equality seems to not give them sufficient reflection and 
deliberation. International human rights law needs to rethink the concept of 
substantive equality and create limits, conditions and circumstances for its best 
implementation. Equality should therefore embrace both the formality of the 
Rawlsian aspect of equal worth of individuals that ought to be reflected in the 
laws but also Dworkin’s notion of equal concern for all aspects that determine 
the cultural, social and economic status of an individual. 
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Chapter IV:  The relationship between equality and affirmative action 
 
4.1 Legal issues that arise from the interaction between affirmative action and 
equality: the compatibility test 
 
Within the international human rights system, the compatibility between 
equality and affirmative action remains uncertain. Such uncertainty derives 
from many themes that have been discussed along the lines of this paper but 
also national contexts, perceptions and the uniqueness of every legal system. 
The first problem that arises, relates to the legal nature of both concepts. At 
this point, we cannot doubt that in some instances and in regards to certain 
groups States face an obligation to put in motion affirmative action policies. 
Nevertheless, the realization of this obligation can interfere with the 
realization of the substantive right to equality of individuals that do not belong 
to a disadvantaged group. Which one should be given priority? That has been 
a long asked question in the literature, formulated under the symbolic 
compatibility test between affirmative action and the right to equality, a test 
that justifies the analysis in this paper.  Is affirmative action a right or a 
principle? Is the test of compatibility raising a normative conflict within the 
international human rights system?  
The fact that equality- at least in the sense of equal treatment- is a right, has 
been discussed by O'Cinneide that stated that it is “commonplace for national 
constitutions and international human rights instruments to recognize the 
importance of equality as a fundamental right”.162 Within the human rights 
scholarship and jurisprudence, equality seems to have a defined nature 
although it can dissatisfy and offer misleading guarantees.163 Affirmative 
action on the other hand, has never been regarded as a human right, nor has it 
been characterized as an international principle. As mentioned earlier, it is an 
obligation in the form of a catalyst for achieving equality and non-
discrimination and can be seen as complementary to these rights, but as it is 
formulated today, it seems to have no independent stance. 
The relationship between the right of the majority (to equality) and the right of 
the minority (to non-discrimination and implicitly to affirmative action) has 
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been vaguely discussed under the idea of temporality of affirmative action and 
the prohibition of maintaining separate standards in society by Bossuyt.164 His 
report on affirmative action reads that “there is no contradiction in aiming 
simultaneously at the protection of minorities and the prevention of 
discrimination”.165 Although ambitious, this statement fails to reveal its 
simplicity in practice and that is because affirmative action may be permanent 
and indeed lead to different standards or may be overridden by the force that 
the right to equality has within the international and national frameworks. 
In reality, balancing the nature and demands of both concepts is a burden that 
falls on a nation’s legislative or judiciary as the international human rights law 
seems to formulate guidelines rather than properly assist States in 
understanding how to achieve equal standards by not falling into the trap of 
reversed discrimination. Such burden could for example relate to the 
proportionality of affirmative action or the level of compensation provided by 
the policy in question. The compatibility between equality and affirmative 
action has been discussed for example by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights as well as the scholarship.166 Although the Inter-American 
Commission has put forward that the two are compatible if affirmative action 
pursues a legitimate aim and it is proportional, studies seem to overlook and 
not employ a deep legal analysis of the nature of both concepts and their 
interaction. This compatibility issue derives from the fragmentation and lack 
of a normative hierarchy within the international law system as a whole that 
affects the isolation of one right and consequent obligations of States from 
others.167 As Pavel explained “legal conflicts may reflect deeper conflicts of 
moral values” and the relationship between affirmative action and equality, 
although not apparently conflictual does represent the ambiguous rhetoric of 
equality and the struggle of the legal system to gratify all individuals. 168  
The second compatibility problem that arises is related to the type of equality 
and the meaning of equality within a domestic system. Although international 
human rights law is an independent body of law with its own rules and 
principles, the rights that it preaches are still implemented by States within 
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national jurisdictions and hence the two areas are strongly interconnected. The 
presence of formal equality in constitutional systems along with a restrictive 
interpretation of this concept can act as a barrier to affirmative action policies 
that would cause positive discrimination. In such cases, as De Vos explicates, 
States are left with the question of the degree that they are ready to agree to 
affirmative action “by ways of exception” taking the same approach that the 
ECJ did in the Briheche case when it declared that affirmative action is a 
“limited derogation to formal equality”.169 This means that for a State to 
legitimately and legally enact affirmative action policies they have to first 
create a constitutional legal framework that allows for deviations from the 
traditional formal equality principle.  
A legitimate constitutional redesign would also imply that States have to 
determine the disadvantaged groups that are targeted by this exception. The 
Austrian Constitution seems to illustrate a good example of the differences in 
regulation towards various disadvantaged groups. Article 7.1 provides that “all 
nationals are equal before the law, privileges based upon birth, sex, estate, 
class or religion are excluded and no one shall be discriminated against 
because of his disability” while article 7.2 reads “ The Federation, Laender 
and municipalities subscribe to the de-facto equality of men and women, 
measures to promote factual equality of women and men, particularly by 
eliminating actually existing inequalities, are admissible”.170 The Austrian 
Constitution seems to suggest a formal approach to birth, sex, state, class, 
religion and disability and a substantive equality goal in relation to gender 
equality by not only explicitly mentioning de facto equality but by providing a 
legal background for affirmative action measures in the field of gender. 
Another example would be the French Constitution that in article 1 expresses a 
formalistic approach towards “origin, race or religion” as prohibited grounds 
for discrimination are but at the same time declares equal opportunity between 
men and women.171 As I explained before, affirmative action is a variable 
obligation and not all vulnerable or discriminated groups are accorded the 
same courtesy of being affirmative action beneficiaries. That is because in 
relation to some groups, such as for example, linguistic minorities, States have 
not assumed an international obligation to adopt special measures and combat 
the discriminations that these groups face. The constitutional protection of 
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certain disadvantaged groups via the international human rights system is thus 
unstable and could create ideological, moral or legal conflicts. 
In the event that a State does indeed possess the constitutional background to 
accommodate affirmative action and provided that substantive equality is a 
State’s goal, the third set of compatibility issues that arise are related to the 
characteristics and requirements of affirmative action. A State should always 
justify how the affirmative action program in question pursues a legitimate 
aim to avoid domestic constitutional challenges and violations of international 
human rights standards of equality. The requirement of a legitimate aim is 
linked to the proportionality that affirmative action has to demonstrate, in the 
sense that it is not arbitrary, unconditional and illegitimate. Before adopting 
such corrective measures, a State has to observe the levels of under-
representation of vulnerable groups within certain sectors. Such sectors can 
range from political participation to State pensions or grants-in-aid or 
participation in education. States must prove thus that measures are necessary 
and the response to the necessity is proportional. 
For example, the Spanish Law 1/2004 of Comprehensive Protection Measures 
against Violence against Women172 describes in its preamble that it is based on 
the constitutional mandate to “adopt positive action” and ensure fundamental 
rights for women. This law establishes new institutions to guarantee its 
enforcement and enumerates the rights of the victims of domestic violence. 
Inter alia we identify specific labor rights, free legal assistance, social aid that 
can reach the equivalent of 6 months of unemployment benefits and priory in 
the allocation of a spot in protected public residences.  
The Spanish law responds to the requirement of legitimate aim by proving in 
its preamble that violence against women is a reality and that it is not longer 
an “invisible crime” and that it originates after various recommendations of 
international human rights bodies such as the CEDAW or Human Rights 
Commission. The proportionality requirement is also fulfilled by the law 
expressively mentioning for example that different forms of social aid will be 
accorded after an examination of the economical situation of the victim, such 
as age, employment status and history and difficulty to access the job market. 
The Spanish law also includes amendments to publicity and media laws and 
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  For the purpose of these paragraphs, specific relevant parts of the Law 1/2004 have been 
translated when referred to, specifically Chapter II, III and IV. The law can be accessed in 
Spanish at http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2004-21760 as consulted on May 
20th 2015 at 18:13 pm.	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labor laws, adopting a transformative equality approach by institutionalizing 
change and promoting gender equality on all social fronts. 
Aside from the requirement of proportionality, affirmative action has in some 
circumstances a compensatory nature but as explained earlier, such 
compensation has to be made evident by the legal system that it is not a reward 
or a pecuniary unconditional advantage but rather a mechanism of making 
amends for the inequalities historically perpetrated. The nature of 
compensation has the potential to affect public attitudes towards affirmative 
action and ultimately to influence its efficiency. If the majority perceives the 
minority to be the beneficiaries of certain advantages within an industry, such 
perception could backfire and the policy could not only lead to failure but 
aggravations of discriminatory behaviors and attitudes. Affirmative action has 
to be thus accompanied by a strong explanatory campaign and when possible 
avoid the threats of self-stereotyping by fostering a legislation that promotes 
the development of merits rather than selective or inequitable distributions in 
relation to majorities.  
Finally, a legal problem that might arise in relation to affirmative action is that 
it might be an initiative very hard to identify. The line between measures that 
tackle with discrimination and special measures is not simply drawn by the 
international human rights system. Is a social allowance for a child with 
disabilities a measure of inclusion and a reflection of the welfare system or is 
it a special compensatory measure? Is prolonged paid maternal leave a simple 
measure or can it be considered a permanent special measure in accordance 
with the interpretation of the CEDAW Committee of article 4.2?  
Research on the matter suggests that the easiest way to spot the difference is 
by looking at the temporal axis of the measure-because affirmative action 
tends to be temporary- and the social category that it targets.173 As per the 
definition and delimitation from Chapter II, affirmative action can cover a 
broad spectrum of legislative or governmental initiatives. In relation to direct 
and indirect discrimination, States have via the international human rights 
system positive and negative obligations to ensure the protection of human 
rights and their realization equally. The rights recognized in both the ICCPR 
and ICESCR must be guaranteed equally with no distinction of “race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status” via the common article 2 of both treaties. 
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 In reality, the need for affirmative action comes from the lack of compliance 
of States with these precepts not necessarily in the present but maybe 
historically. The lack of historical compliance thus justifies the need for 
affirmative action in the present and its design as temporary in some cases. 
But, as we have seen in chapter II, when discrimination is severe and systemic 
special measures can be permanent. That combined with the fact that a 
vulnerable group is also the beneficiary of normal measure for the 
advancement of human rights shows that affirmative action is hard to 
distinguish within a multitude of State interventions combating discrimination. 
Although affirmative action has to be proportional, it is the level of advantages 
conferred by these policies and the making of amends element that could 
serve, to my belief, as a distinguishing factor. The legal issues that can arise 
from the interaction between equality and non-discrimination and affirmative 
action are therefore diverse and can take place in both the domestic and 
transnational legal sphere. Affirmative action shows a great compatibility with 
the concept of substantive and transformative equality and with time and an 
additional reflection on its nature, duration and peculiar elements “it has the 
power to consolidate development strategies that are more likely to generate 
economic equity” and generally, real equality.174 
	  
Conclusion 
 
Affirmative action is an international obligation that complements the right to 
equality and non-discrimination and acts as a channel for its fulfillment, in 
relation to some present or historically disadvantaged groups such as women, 
people with disabilities or racial minorities. Affirmative action can present 
itself under denominations such as “special measures”, “positive action” or 
“specific measures” although the terminology seems to be irrelevant as both 
States and human rights bodies, as well as non-State actors use these terms 
interchangeably. Affirmative action is a variable obligation in relation to the 
disadvantaged groups it targets, as women, people with disabilities and racial 
groups are protected by the CEDAW, CRPD and CERD which expressively 
establish an obligation of taking special measures. Other forms of 
discrimination are to be combated either via ordinary State measures or by the 
adoption of voluntary affirmative action policies, upon an exercise of 
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59	  
	  
discretion in relation to the nature of General Comments or Recommendations 
of the UN Human Rights or CESCR Committees. 
The variability of affirmative action is also related to its duration. Although it 
is believed to be temporary, we have seen that some special measures can be 
permanent. For example, special measures related to the protection of 
maternity or translation assistance for linguistic minorities are two examples 
of exceptional unlimited measures. Due to the controversial binding nature of 
General Comments or Recommendations that suggest the duration of special 
measure, I have highlighted that States enjoy a large margin of appreciation to 
determine the temporality of affirmative action and in fields such as 
disabilities there is no sequential limitation for special measures. Nevertheless, 
affirmative action is more likely to be constitutionally upheld when it is 
temporary. Special measures are characterized by a presumption of prejudice 
accorded to individuals belonging to a disadvantaged group. Their sole 
inclusion in these groups makes them beneficiaries of a compensatory 
mechanism for their potential discrimination. Nevertheless, the compensation 
affirmative action provides is collective and thus, cannot respond 
proportionally to singular situations. Affirmative action has to fulfill the 
requirements of legitimate aim and proportionality in order for it to be 
legitimately implemented into national systems. At the same time, these 
special measures have to reconcile within a domestic system the divide 
between formal and substantive equality. The requirement of legitimate aim is 
satisfied when a State demonstrates that it is affected by certain social 
imbalances and discrimination flux, and in that sense, it is a numerical 
requirement that could be deduced by observing disaggregated data. The 
requirement of proportionality requires States to respond to those imbalances 
by redistributing the goods in question in a correlative manner. Proportionality 
means that affirmative action policies should not be unconditionally 
advantaging any group and that the principle of merit should still be operative 
within a certain industry, although such interpretation of proportionality has 
been used mostly in the labor field. Finally, the relationship between equality 
and affirmative action can create various legal issues related to the nature of 
both concepts. Formal equality, a traditional modus operandi of most 
constitutional systems limits affirmative action and implies that preferential 
treatment is not to be accorded to any individual. Formal equality implies 
identical legal treatment and that before the law individuals are equal. 
Substantive equality, on the other hand, represents an ideal of opportunity and 
results and implies that preferential or differentiating legal treatment is 
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allowed in order to obtain visible and real equality. For an affirmative action 
policy to be operating in a domestic system, substantive equality has to be an 
exception to formal equality. 
 Although substantive equality is a concept more likely to achieve real 
equality, its international human rights mandate might not be sufficient to 
respond to both direct and indirect discrimination as it disregards the peculiar 
circumstances of every individual. Affirmative action is a collective measure 
designed to achieve substantive equality. Nevertheless, substantive equality 
might need to broaden its implications and adopt a concern for human 
preferences, ambitions and self-envisioned idea of success as Dworkin 
suggested. Equality needs to mirror an equal concern of governments for 
individuals and as Rawls explained, that concern has to be present when 
distributing resources, in order to avoid a potentially controversial and unfair 
future redistribution. If affirmative action targets systemic discrimination and 
operates with the goal of achieving real equality, if it responds to inequalities 
with transformative proportional measures and is mainstreamed as an 
equitable tool gathering social support and positive attitudes, only then will it 
have the potential to transform societal dynamics and consolidate long-term 
non-discriminative public and private institutions.  
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